

AN OCEAN CLOSER: RE-EXAMINING US FORCE REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

AN OCEAN CLOSER: RE-EXAMINING US FORCE REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE

by

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ABSTRACT

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What is a sufficient U.S. military force structure for ground forces in Europe given the current VUCA environment? The original plan to draw forces down to 2 ground brigades has been put on hold based on a request by the EUCOM Commander. How does EUCOM's strategic vision and force requirements compare with potential future US National strategies? How does the current financial crisis effect the situation? This paper will explore these issues and offer an assessment on the continued value of sustaining the current US ground force presence in Europe. It will also suggest possible adjustments to US national security documents.

AN OCEAN CLOSER: RE-EXAMINING US FORCE REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE

Our strategic approach promotes stable environments, protects U.S. interests and reduces the likelihood of crises that trigger contingency responses.

—General Bantz J. Craddock
Commander, EUCOM,

13 March 2008, Testimony to The House Armed Services Committee

US ground force presence in Europe has declined significantly since the end of the Cold War. In the late 1980's over 200,000 Soldiers, organized with 2 Corps Headquarters, 4 Division Headquarters, and over 16 ground combat brigade-equivalents, were stationed in Germany.¹ In the early 1990's a massive reduction in ground forces led to force of about 42,000 Soldiers structured around 5 ground combat brigades.²

This 5 ground brigade structure, along with 2 division headquarters, 1 Corps Headquarters and the enabling or support battalions and brigades normally assigned with each headquarters, was maintained for nearly 10 years in Europe. This force provided the initial military force that entered Bosnia and Kosovo and supported North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations in the mid to late 1990's.³ This force structure was also available to the EUCOM commander to carry out his Theater Security Cooperation campaign.

In 2003, the Bush Administration announced a plan to draw down US ground forces in Europe to about 28,000 Soldiers, centered around 2 Brigade combat teams.⁴ This reduction began with the return to the United States of a ground brigade, a division headquarters, and numerous enabling organizations. At the same time, the Army units remaining in Europe began to undergo a transformation into a more modular structure,

designed to increase their ability to deploy rapidly. These transformations should be completed by 2013.⁵

The current EUCOM Commander, General Bantz Craddock, however, asked the Secretary of Defense in the fall of 2007 to suspend the ongoing drawdown, based on continuing requirements to sustain training and other exercises with foreign militaries and as a hedge against current risks to US security.⁶ This request was approved by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates in November, 2007.⁷

With the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact gone, the US logically no longer needs to retain Cold War-era amounts of US combat power in Europe. However, when does the United States reach a point with ground force reductions in Europe where EUCOM can no longer meet its strategy because it lacks sufficient and appropriate forces? Has EUCOM already reached that point? And if so, is there a path back to sufficient forces or alternative ways to accomplish EUCOM's Active Security strategy?

Review of the Current National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy

President Bush's National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2006 and the June 2008 Department of Defense National Defense Strategy (NDS) explain that maintaining NATO as a "vital pillar of US foreign policy" is critically important at the National level.⁸ What is not addressed, however, is the quantity of military forces that the US needs to provide or station in Europe in order to maintain both leadership of, and a "seat at the table" within NATO.

The National Defense Strategy speaks of "continuing to transform overseas U.S. military presence through global defense posture alignment,"⁹ but provides no details on the specific capabilities that should be stationed in Europe. However, it does state that

a “forward network of capabilities and arrangements with allies and partners to ensure strategic access” is important in order to meet the objectives laid out in the NSS.¹⁰

The NSS also states that the United States must strengthen and expand alliances and partnerships. The benefit of this is so we can “be able to rely on many partners for certain low risk missions such as peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance.”¹¹ The National Security Strategy further acknowledges that “complex counterinsurgency and high end conventional operations are likely to draw on fewer partners with the capability to act in support of mutual goals.”¹²

These documents make it clear that maintaining NATO as a strong and relevant security organization is vital to the United States; the primary benefit of NATO is that it provides a collection of countries in an existing military organization that have the capability to assist with the shared burden of maintaining international security and stability.

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)

The 2006 QDR, which was written and released while Secretary Rumsfeld was still the Secretary of Defense, explicitly directs a plan to reduce the quantity of U.S. ground forces in Europe and return them to the United States. The QDR states “This reorientation builds upon transformational changes already underway, shifting the joint force: from dependence on large, permanent overseas garrisons toward expeditionary operations utilizing more austere bases abroad.”¹³

It is unclear why Secretary Rumsfeld was so insistent on removing further forces from Europe. It has been speculated that part of his desire was to punish what he called “Old Europe” in particular Germany, for its 2002 public opposition to US plans to

invade Iraq. This idea of the Bush Administration punishing Germany for its opposition was discussed in great detail by the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) during testimony in 2003, as the committee debated the proposed EUCOM plan to reduce forces in Germany and move a portion of them to eastern European countries that supported the U.S. war in Iraq.¹⁴

In addition, when these reductions of US forces in Europe were announced in 2003, the plan envisioned the deactivation, rather than relocation of many units then stationed in Europe.¹⁵ This was in keeping with Secretary Rumsfeld's desires to reduce the size of the Army and rely on technology and special operations troops in the future. Eliminating units from Europe rather than eliminating existing units at stateside bases would also attract much less opposition from Congress and was believed, therefore, to be much more politically acceptable. However, the failure to secure a quick victory in Iraq and Afghanistan led to a new requirement to expand the size of both the Army and the Marine Corps. Due to this new requirement, the Army received authorization in January 2007 to permanently increase its force structure by 74,000 Soldiers.¹⁶

The QDR also states that the US must "move away from a static defense in obsolete Cold War garrisons."¹⁷ A reason for this type of wording could go back to the events and the corresponding bad press that the Army received in early 1999 with the slow deployment of Task Force Hawk, an Apache Helicopter-based task force moved from Germany to Albania to support operations in Kosovo. The Army was extremely slow to get its forces into Albania and it was criticized as being too large and too fixed in its large bases in Germany.¹⁸ The thought that the Army was too large and too slow to deploy quickly was still very much alive in 2003 in the Bush Administration.¹⁹ However,

the real issue was not with the facilities or bases in Germany; rather, as General Eric Shinseki noted, it was the lack of infrastructure on the Albanian side that limited the amount of forces that could be brought in.²⁰

As with the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy, the 2006 QDR contains no discussion or analysis on the U.S. force structure required in Europe in order to maintain the United States' leadership of NATO or to meet EUCOM's Active Security Strategy. It is apparent that existing policy documents do not help clarify the end-state requirement.

EUCOM Strategy of Active Security

EUCOM's Area of Responsibility (AOR) is composed of 51 sovereign nations where approximately 500 million people reside.²¹ The active security strategy is derived from the strategic objectives of "Defend the Homeland" and "Create and Maintain an Environment that advances U.S Strategic and Economic Interests."²² While the specific wording of these objectives has changed over time, these objectives have served EUCOM well, as demonstrated by its successful contribution to peace in Europe for nearly 60 years. However, during most of that time, EUCOM possessed a significantly larger force permanently stationed in Europe.

The list of strategic objectives and priorities that support active security is long and most require the participation of ground forces to execute them successfully. Strategic objectives and priorities such as: ensuring EUCOM forces are trained and ready for global deployment; transforming EUCOM and NATO militaries to ensure effective expeditionary capabilities for the conduct of out of area operations; protecting Allies and partners within a stable middle east; preserving basing and access to ensure

strategic freedom of action; and averting local crises and preventing those that do arise from becoming regional conflicts, can only be executed successfully when there is an adequate military ground force available to carry them out.²³ These objectives and priorities are critical to the success of the active security strategy.

EUCOM's other key task, Support of the Global War on Terror, is not only executed by providing EUCOM ground forces to support the fight in Iraq and Afghanistan. Another key element, according to the 2008 EUCOM Posture Statement, is using:

EUCOM based forces in the forefront of promoting the transformation of European militaries. The engagement with, and support to, our Allies and partners underlines the importance of persistent presence of U.S. forces for building effective expeditionary capacity for multilateral theater and global operations.²⁴

Clearly, the EUCOM Commander believes that he requires ground forces based in Europe in order for EUCOM to successfully support both NSS and NDS derived requirements and to execute the EUCOM strategy of active security. Without access to sufficient ground forces, his ability to meet the objectives and priorities of "active security" is at great risk.

Current Situation in the EUCOM AOR

Based on the previously discussed plans of the Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, US ground forces in Europe were to be severely cut with the result that only 2 brigades, a Stryker Brigade and an Airborne Brigade, would remain stationed in Europe.²⁵ Additionally, a brigade from the United States would rotate for 6 month training rotations into small bases being constructed in Romania and Bulgaria.²⁶

As the details of these planned cuts became apparent, coincident with the continued deployment of almost all of United States Army Europe's (USAREUR) forces to support the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, EUCOM saw that they had little to no remaining capability to pursue its active security strategies in its AOR.²⁷

In addition, despite the intentions to move U.S. forces from Germany back to the United States, there is now nowhere to put them. Congress has only partially funded the Base Realignment and Closure Act, which governs a series of base closings and consolidations.²⁸ This partial funding led to a lack of spaces to place returning Soldiers; the Army has told Secretary of Defense Gates that it would have to spend millions of dollars to prepare temporary lodging if the drawdown were to continue.²⁹ In an extremely budget constricted environment, the spending of this much money to temporarily lodge Soldiers and their families, at a likely lower quality of life standard than provided at existing European bases, made little sense.

These events, along with concerns about a resurgent Russia that was making its presence again felt in Europe, prompted the EUCOM Commander, GEN Craddock, in November 2007 to ask for a delay in the drawdown of any additional combat brigades from Europe for the foreseeable future. This leaves Europe with approximately 40,000 Soldiers and 4 ground combat brigades.

The New Obama Administration

As the Obama administration settles into office and begins its process to reexamine and adjust the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy, the issues of a strategy and a corresponding US ground force structure in Europe will have to be addressed. This issue was not addressed in "A 21st Century Military for

America,” the section of the Obama campaign’s web site related to national defense and military issues. Then candidate Obama did speak in detail of creating a “stronger partnership with Europe for a safer America”³⁰ and he has also stated that he “intends to rebuild the alliances, partnerships and institutions necessary to confront common threats and enhance common security.”³¹ More insight on what President Obama will decide on Europe may be found in what those around him have stated in the past. Former EUCOM Commander Marine General (R) James Jones, the new Obama Administration National Security Advisor, has been on record as expressing reservations on continuing the drawdown. He stated in 2007 on a C-Span news show that, “As I left Europe, in my last report, I expressed some concern that the size of the Army in Europe had perhaps gone too low.”³² This is telling as General Jones had been a proponent of the drawdown in 2005, when he was the EUCOM Commander when the original drawdown plan was released.

Clearly, our military strategy in Europe is not one of the most pressing issues on the new administration’s short-term agenda. Reviewing and developing strategies on Iraq, Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay, among other issues, will demand much of the administration’s initial effort. EUCOM and other planners should use this available time to develop a fresh proposal for what the future ground force structure in Europe should look like.

The U.S. Financial Crisis Impact

The current financial crisis in the United States appears to be a multi-year event which will cost American taxpayers potentially trillions of dollars. With a current total national debt of over 10 trillion dollars, the Obama Administration has said that they will

be taking a close look at all government expenditures and cancel programs that do not produce results.

Under the plan to reduce the Army's footprint in Germany to around 24,000 troops from the approximately 40,000 Soldiers currently stationed there, the 16,000 Soldiers and their units would be transferred to previously identified bases in the United States.³³ These bases do not have spare capacity and new construction is required to expand the capacity to accept these units. As stated earlier Congress has been slow in appropriating the military construction funds to build the unit facilities and the schedule had fallen behind to the point where the Army was going to have to spend hundreds of millions of dollars in temporary facilities to house the scheduled return of Soldiers and their families.

The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that it would cost about \$3.6 Billion dollars to move the previously identified units and 16,000 Soldiers from Germany back to CONUS and construct facilities for them. The long term savings the United States would achieve once these moves were complete would total around \$400 million dollars a year.³⁴

Russia

Prior to assuming his new role as the NATO ISAF Commander in Afghanistan, General David McKiernan, as the USAREUR Commander, stated that "There are potentially dangerous places and conditions in the European area of responsibility. We don't know what is going to happen, in terms of a resurgent Russia."³⁵

These statements were made well before the Russian move into the Republic of Georgia in the summer of 2008. In addition, the current issues with natural gas

deliveries to the Ukraine and western Europe as well as the suspected cyber attacks by Russia against Estonia and Georgia in the last 2 years have reinforced the fact that the United States and NATO must make a stronger effort to reengage Moscow and work towards better and more productive relations instead of returning to a cold war like situation.

General McKiernan wanted to keep the current 40,000 Soldiers stationed in Germany in order to conduct training with the Russian Military as a means to strengthen the ties between the two countries. He stated, "I believe in my heart there will be an opportunity in the future where we'll be on the same side."³⁶

EUCOM has taken this idea and have incorporated it into their current strategy and have recently made "Russia as a Responsible Partner" one of their 8 theater objectives.³⁷

Can the U.S. lead NATO if it has Little/No Forces in Europe?

As the unquestioned leader of NATO since its inception in 1949, is there a point where the U.S. can no longer effectively lead the organization because its force contribution has become too small? While all national level documents states that maintaining American leadership of NATO is just as important as keeping NATO relevant, they do not provide guidance on how to do this if there are little to no US forces stationed in Europe. However, most experts on the subject believe that the US must maintain sufficient forces in Europe if it wants to retain its leadership role. General (Retired) Montgomery Meigs, a former USAREUR Commander, stated to Congress "are we really ready for the loss of influence drastically reducing the forward presence will entail?"³⁸ The amount of ground forces at the time of his statement in 2003 was around

60,000 troops. Clearly he was concerned that a reduction to around 24,000 troops would put the United States below the threshold of maintaining U.S. leadership of NATO.

It was further stated by Dr. Frederick Kagan, that “Taking such action now would do irreparable harm to the NATO alliance.”³⁹ Additionally, ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee, Representative Ike Skelton, had major concerns about this drawdown plan and has also said that it could have major impacts on our relationship with NATO.⁴⁰ Based on these comments, a 40,000 Soldier force built around 4 ground combat brigades stationed in Europe can provide the leverage the United States needs to maintain its leadership of NATO.

The Benefits of Interoperability

NATO interoperability, the ability of troops from different nations within NATO to function together on the battlefield, came about during the Cold War due to the critical requirement to maintain military cohesion in the face of a potential Warsaw Pact attack. The development and adoption of thousands of standardization agreements (STANAGS) established common training and readiness requirements for almost all aspects of military operations.⁴¹

Aided by existing interoperability capabilities, NATO member states were able to deploy and employ themselves effectively in Bosnia and Kosovo. Subsequently, many Cold War Era STANAGS were updated to reflect the changing “out of sector” nature of potential future NATO missions. The benefits of this interoperability are still reaped today in places such as Afghanistan, as most NATO members are sufficiently trained and equipped to handle the missions they are assigned in the country.

Interoperability is a capability that has taken decades to develop and perfect; however, since the fall of the Berlin Wall the majority of the effort in maintaining interoperability amongst NATO member states has been expended by the United States.⁴² Today most member nations of NATO and other European partners go to the United States Army Europe's Joint Multinational Training Command (JMTC) in Germany to conduct their mission rehearsal exercises prior to deploying to Afghanistan. The availability of US ground forces in Germany to assist the JMTC mission in preparing these NATO member states and others to deploy has been extensive and would be severely constrained if they were further reduced as planned.

Impacts to Force Projection

A recurring theme discussed earlier by the Bush administration and especially former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld is that the forces stationed in Europe are "tied to static, cold war bases" implying that they lack strategic mobility to move anywhere in the world to conduct operations. While it is true that the bases that the Army occupies in Europe were in fact used during the Cold War, the reality is that these bases possess or facilitate strategic mobility.

Ground forces currently stationed in Germany and Italy enjoy some of the best strategy mobility facilities that the United States has. The United States and Germany have invested heavily in the German transportation network, with the result that U.S. military equipment can move to large port and air facilities on good roads and an extensive rail network.⁴³ Ramstein and Aviano Airbases have been critical to the fights in Iraq and Afghanistan not only by pushing out EUCOM-based forces to the fight, but

also handling the immense amount of cargo and troops moving to the combat zones from the United States.⁴⁴

The Congressional Budget Office has concluded that the Army can save at least 5 days of shipping time by sea for deployments to most of the world's current crisis areas by using forces based in Germany.⁴⁵ This time savings could be critical in a scenario in which the U.S. had little to no advance warning that a crisis were to occur.

In addition, in the months preceding the invasion of Iraq and for some items continuing to the present, the German Government offered deployment assistance to US Forces in Germany during their predeployment training exercises and their movement of equipment and personnel within Germany to ports and airbases to deploy into the CENTCOM AOR. Despite the political rhetoric at the national level against the Iraq war, this assistance was substantial and much of it was for free.⁴⁶

The majority of Army forces in Germany have gone through the modularization process and the remainder are scheduled to be complete in 2012.⁴⁷ This process, begun in 2005, has had the effect of making units more modular and leaner than their previous organizational structures. This reorganization of units results in reduced amounts of strategic ship and air deployment assets and will enable units to deploy more quickly.

Romania and Bulgaria

In the months before the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, many Western European nations, especially Germany and France, disagreed with the Bush Administration over the need to go to war in Iraq, causing the Secretary of Defense to label them "Old Europe."⁴⁸ At the same time, the SECDEF, looked to "new Europe"

and, in particular, Bulgaria and Romania, as nations where he wanted to build new, austere US bases that would host rotational US forces for up to 6 month periods. This time would be spent training with the host nation forces as well as providing a force available to deploy to any crisis spot in the region.⁴⁹ EUCOM developed Joint Task Force – East (JTF-E) based on this rotational concept. Both Romania and Bulgaria offered old bases and training areas that the U.S. could refurbish and use as forward training sites. This idea was thought to be cheap in terms of construction costs and also that we would be getting even larger and better training areas than those available in Germany.⁵⁰

Upon further examination, EUCOM and USAREUR found that these bases needed considerable work to the point where the existing facilities had to be demolished and replaced with new facilities, considerably raising the original estimated costs. This was due to the dilapidated condition of the facilities as well as the large amounts of hazardous building materials like asbestos roofing tiles used by the host nations. However the bigger issue was the size and capability of the training areas. As Dr. Kagan pointed out to Congress in 2003, the facilities and training areas in Romania and Bulgaria were vastly inferior to the ones in Germany.⁵¹

The stress on Army Soldiers from the repeated deployments in support of the Global War on Terror must be seriously considered before the United States begins full brigade level 6 month deployments to Romania and Bulgaria in 2011 when the construction at the bases is complete. Currently, USAREUR is conducting an annual 2 month exercise in each country in temporary facilities in order to keep the JTF-E concept moving. The Congressional Budget Office concluded that 6 month

unaccompanied unit deployments to Romania and Bulgaria would increase family separation and could decrease retention.

Despite these drawbacks the Joint Task Force-East concept can still support the EUCOM Commander's strategic objectives, particularly in the Eastern Balkan and Black Sea region. However, these bases cannot compare to their German counterparts in their ability to support training in terms of quality, to Army Standards, and quantity in terms of size of training areas and throughput on firing ranges. Nor can they quickly project power either within or out of the EUCOM AOR at the rate it can be done from Germany and Italy due to their inadequate transportation infrastructure. This is important as ground forces require quality training areas and ranges so that they can accomplish the myriad of deployment training requirements and Mission Rehearsal Exercises in order to reach certification for deployment.

Force Structure Recommendation

A good model for what EUCOM requires in terms of ground forces is to go back to the mid to late 1990's and look at the size and type of Theater Engagement Strategy that EUCOM was conducting and the ground force structure that was available at that time to the EUCOM commander. In his comments to Congress in 1996, then EUCOM Commander General George Joulwan stated it is much better to influence events rather than react to them later.⁵² He also stated the need to consistently interact with our NATO allies and leverage their assets. In order to do this, he stated that the United States must stay engaged in NATO politically, economically, diplomatically and militarily.⁵³ He did not make any requests to Congress for more ground forces to achieve his strategy. Taking the peace keeping missions to Bosnia and Kosovo out of

the equation, EUCOM then had enough forces, based on the 4 ground brigades and the other divisional and Corps enablers that were stationed in Germany and the airborne brigade that was stationed in Italy, to meet its strategic requirements.

In addition, when he testified to Congress in 2003, General (Retired) Montgomery Meigs the former United States Army Europe (USAREUR) Commander, stated to Congress that over the last 4 years EUCOM ground forces conducted over 40 percent of all Army deployments, much of that work with new NATO Armies and peacekeeping.⁵⁴

The last of the division headquarters that existed in the mid to late 1990s will soon be redeployed to the U.S. as the Army has shifted to a brigade centric modular force structure. The 3 ground brigades that are currently still stationed in Germany and the one in Italy provide a robust force structure that supports EUCOM's active security strategy, based on the apparent success of a similar force structure in the mid to late 1990s and early 2000s. While the current force structure is 1 brigade less than what was stationed in Germany before, the current force requirement has been reduced by the lack of a major peacekeeping mission such as in Bosnia or Kosovo.⁵⁵

However, EUCOM's ability to execute and maintain its active security strategy remains at risk while the U.S remains heavily engaged in the global war on terror and the ground combat brigades in Europe are consistently committed to that effort. A potential way to partially mitigate this risk is by the continued use of CONUS-based reserve forces to participate in exercises with foreign military forces within the EUCOM AOR. While not ideal, this method has been used by EUCOM already to bridge the gap until Germany based troops are available.⁵⁶

Additional Recommendations

As previously discussed, the wording in the next Quadrennial Defense Review, currently scheduled to be published in 2010 should accurately reflect the actual capabilities of US bases in Europe. Subjective wording such as “static” or “obsolete” should be eliminated if they do not reflect the facts on the ground. Much has changed in Germany since the end of the Cold War not only in the capabilities of the bases, but also the ability of the ground forces stationed there to rapidly deploy to crisis areas due to unit structure changes caused by Army transformation. As an extremely influential document that is critical for future force structure and basing decisions, the Quadrennial Defense Review should be objective in its approach towards basing in Germany.

The United States should continue to develop and implement the EUCOM Joint Task Force-East initiative. Despite drawbacks in the quantity and quality of training that can be executed in both Romania and Bulgaria, the benefits of American ground forces in the eastern Balkan region working with our new NATO partners are significant. EUCOM should continue to use smaller force elements for shorter periods of time until a sustainable GWOT deployment schedule is achieved.

Recommendations to Mitigate the Original Plan if Executed

If the US decides to reduce down to the original plan to station only 2 brigades in EUCOM, a potential way to mitigate this impact to EUCOM's active security strategy is to continue or expand the current use of Army Reserve and National Guard in combined exercises. While lacking the cohesiveness that occurs with having a habitual relationships with European-based U.S. ground forces, this method will at least keep

U.S. forces in contact with foreign militaries in the AOR and contribute to efforts to maintain NATO interoperability, although at a greatly reduced level.

In addition, the US could rotate an entire ground brigade from outside of EUCOM or an even larger force through Joint Task Force-East. While clearly not the optimal solution based on the issues previously discussed, this would continue to allow sustained contact between US and NATO and other European partner's militaries.

Conclusion

As the new Obama Administration has made clear during its presidential campaign, maintaining NATO as an effective organization to achieve our national security interests is of vital importance. In order to maintain our leadership of NATO and to have a voice and a "seat at the table" with a collection of like-minded western democracies, we must show to our NATO partners that we are committed to the organization and to the security of Europe. Nothing does this more effectively than maintaining a robust force of rapidly deployable ground forces in Europe, available to deploy or to interact with and train with NATO and partner nation forces for current and future operations. As was recently stated in a Center for a New American Security Study, "NATO remains America's paramount institution for responding militarily to threats around the world—and Germany remains the main place where American Army units train with their NATO counterparts."⁵⁷

No dollar figure can be put on the importance of maintaining US influence in Europe and in NATO. The Congressional Budget Office projected savings of \$400 million a year from the planned restationing of 16,000 Soldiers is insignificant to the

potential damage to US relations with Europe if a drawdown of the originally planned sized is carried out.

In order to carry effectively execute the EUCOM strategy of active security, which supports multiple National Security Strategy Objectives, the EUCOM Commander must have a sufficient amount of US ground forces available in Europe. The effectiveness of currently assigned forces has already been reduced by the lack of forces available due to Global War on Terror commitments. The pause in additional reductions of ground forces is a constructive start. The current 40,000 Soldier force structure, based on 4 ground combat brigades, should become the permanent U.S. ground force structure in Europe for the foreseeable future, both to ensure success in maintaining NATO as a viable security organization and to ensure general security in Europe.

Endnotes

¹ In 1989, V Corps and VII Corps Headquarters along with their various separate enabling brigades were stationed in Germany. 1st Armored Division, 3rd Armored Division, 3rd Infantry Division and 8th Infantry Division each had 3 ground combat brigades. Additional brigades were 2nd Armored Division (FWD), 1st Infantry Division (FWD), the 2nd and 11th Armored Cavalry Regiments and the Berlin Brigade.

² In 1995, V Corps along with its various enabling brigades was stationed in Germany. 1st Armored Division and 3rd Infantry Division, each with 2 ground combat brigades were stationed in Germany. In Italy, the Southern European Task Force had 2 Infantry Battalions stationed in Vincenza.

³ 1st Armored Division, with all of its Germany based assets and attached Corps assets, was the first unit to deploy to Bosnia in 1995. They were replaced a year later by the Germany based 1st Infantry Division. In 1999, elements of the 1st Infantry Division deployed to Kosovo for a year and were replaced by the 1st Armored Division in 2000.

⁴ Deutsche Welle Staff, "US Considering Rethink of Troop Withdrawals in Europe," July 25, 2007, <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,270423,00.html> (accessed November 4, 2008).

⁵ U.S. European Command, *United States European Command Posture Statement 2008*, Posture Statement presented to the 109th Cong., (Stuttgart: U.S. European Command, 2008), 23.

⁶ Thom Shanker, "Gates Suspends reduction of Army Forces in Europe," November 21, 2007, *boston.com*, http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2007/11/21/gates_suspends_reduction (accessed November 4, 2008).

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, March 2006), 38.

⁹ U.S. Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy* (Washington, DC: The Pentagon, June 2008), 16.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 15.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Donald Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 6 February 2006), 41.

¹⁴ U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, *U.S. Force Structure*, 108th Cong., 1st sess., February 26, 2003, 10. Senator Ike Skelton spoke in detail of the dangers of punishing Germany by reducing US force levels there due to their public stance on the Iraq War.

¹⁵ Ibid., 18.

¹⁶ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Defense Infrastructure: Army and Marine Corps Grow the Force Construction Projects Generally Support the Initiative* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, March 2008), 1.

¹⁷ Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, V.

¹⁸ GEN Erik Shinseki, linked from *Frontline* at "General Eric K. Shinseki," <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/future/experts/taskforce.html> (accessed December 14, 2008).

¹⁹ Vernon Loeb, "Rumsfeld plans major changes in U.S. Army," *Washington Post*, June 9, 2003.

²⁰ Shinseki, *Frontline*.

²¹ The United States European Command Home Page, <http://www.eucom.mil> (accessed October 30, 2008)

²² U.S. European Command, *United States European Command Posture Statement 2008*.

²³ Ibid., 10.

²⁴ Ibid., 11.

²⁵ Kristin Roberts, "U.S. military in Europe argues for more forces," October 11, 2007, *boston.com*, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2007/10/11/us_military_in_europe (accessed November 4, 2008)

²⁶ Loeb, "Rumsfeld plans major changes in U.S. Army."

²⁷ Deutsche Welle Staff, "US Considering Rethink of Troop Withdrawals in Europe."

²⁸ Gordon Lubold, "Should More US Troops Be Kept in Europe?" April 24, 2007, *Global Policy Forum*, <http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/challenges/overstretch/2007/0424.htm> (accessed November 4, 2008).

²⁹ Shanker, "Gates Suspends reduction of Army Forces in Europe."

³⁰ Barack Obama and Joe Biden, "A Stronger Partnership with Europe for a Safer America," linked from *BarackObama.com*, <http://www.barackobama.com> (accessed October 14, 2008).

³¹ Ibid.

³² Kevin Dougherty, "Are troop cuts going too far?" *Stars and Stripes European Edition*, June 17, 2007.

³³ Lisa Burgess, "USAREUR Commander wants to keep 40,000 American Soldiers in Europe," *Stars and Stripes European Edition*, October 12, 2007.

³⁴ U.S. Congressional Budget Office, *Options for Changing the Army's Overseas Basing* (Washington, DC: U.S. Congressional Budget Office, May 2004), 40.

³⁵ Burgess, "USAREUR Commander wants to keep 40,000 American Soldiers in Europe."

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ MG Paul Schafer, "EUCOM Strategy of Active Security," briefing slides, 565th Meeting of the Forum for Security Co-operation, November 26, 2008.

³⁸ GEN (R) Montgomery Meigs, "U.S. Force Structure," testimony before U.S. Congress House Armed Services Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess., February 26, 2003.

³⁹ Dr. Frederick Kagan, "U.S. Force Structure," testimony before U.S. Congress House Armed Services Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess., February 26, 2003.

⁴⁰ Ike Skelton, "U.S. Force Structure," testimony before U.S. Congress House Armed Services Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess., February 26, 2003.

⁴¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Handbook* (Brussels: NATO, 2006), 349.

⁴² U.S. European Command, *United States European Command Posture Statement 2008*, 44.

⁴³ U.S. Congressional Budget Office, *Options for Changing the Army's Overseas Basing*, 47.

⁴⁴ U.S. European Command, *United States European Command Posture Statement 2008*, 26.

⁴⁵ U.S. Congressional Budget Office, *Options for Changing the Army's Overseas Basing*, 47.

⁴⁶ Meigs, "U.S. Force Structure."

⁴⁷ Kevin Dougherty, "Security changes force review of European transformation plans," *Stars and Stripes European Edition*, March 17, 2007.

⁴⁸ Jody K Biehl, "Rumsfeld gibe widens gap with 'old' Europeans," January 25, 2003, *SFGate.com*, <http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2003/01/25/MN103130> (accessed November 4, 2008).

⁴⁹ Loeb, "Rumsfeld plans major changes in U.S. Army."

⁵⁰ Kagan, "U.S. Force Structure."

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² U.S. European Command, *United States European Command Posture Statement 1996*, Posture Statement presented to the 104th Cong., (Stuttgart: U.S European Command), 213.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Meigs, "U.S. Force Structure."

⁵⁵ At the present time, the Kosovo mission is executed by CONUS based reserve component units.

⁵⁶ U.S. European Command, *United States European Command Posture Statement 2008*, 23.

⁵⁷ Michael O'Hanlon, *Unfinished Business: U.S. Overseas Military Presence in the 21st Century* (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2008), 43.